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1 Introduction
This paper provides evidence on the long-term impact of market potential on economic
development. Providing explanations for cross-country differences in development levels
is perhaps one of the most important question in economics. A large number of alterna-
tive frameworks have been proposed, and the literature has recently focused on whether
physical geography, culture or institutions matter most in the long term economic per-
formance of countries (Acemoglu et al. 2005 provide a nice summary of the different
theories in competition, arguing strongly in favor of the institutions’ view). I focus here
on a different explanation, where economic geography, synthesized and measured though
a market potential index is key in economic development. The paper derives from the
New Economic Geography literature a structural estimation where the level of factors’
income of a country is related to its export capacity, labeled Market Access (MA) by
Redding and Venables (2004), or Real Market Potential (RMP) by Head and Mayer
(2004). The empirical part evaluates this market potential for all countries in the world
with available trade data over the 1960-2003 period and relates it to income per capita.
Overall results show that market potential is a powerful driver of increases in income per
capita and average wages.
This paper extends our knowledge on how market potential affects development in
several dimensions. First and most important, I show that the cross-sectional striking
success of the economic geography to predict income per capita in Redding and Venables
(2004) holds when considering panel data. This reinforces their finding strongly, and
confirms other recent panel data results, mostly done on an infra-national basis. Second,
the results are robust to an instrumentation strategy intended to capture omitted variable
bias that would survive the introduction of country-level fixed effects. Third, I allow for a
larger set of trade costs variables, notably border effects, colonial preferences and regional
agreements, all of them have a time-varying effect in my specification. This enables to
do simulations regarding policy changes and how those would affect income per capita
through market potential, which is the fourth value added of this paper. The remainder
of the paper is as follows: Section 2 spells out the theoretical foundations of my exercise.
Section 3 describes the data used, while Sections 4 and 5 present respectively econometric
results for the gravity estimates that help build the market potential and the economic
development regressions themselves. Section 6 concludes.
2 Theory
Redding and Venables (2004) and Hanson (2005) were the first contributions to emphasize
the implications of the economic geography model in terms of wage differentials and to
apply it empirically to wages in US counties for Hanson, and to the income per capita
levels in the world for Redding and Venables. The relationship uncovered explains the
level of factor incomes in a country i (wages if labor is the only factor) by a weighted
sum of expenditures of all countries in the world. The weights are bilateral trade costs
from i to each of the destination countries for i’s exports. The resulting term is labeled
1
Market Access (MA) by Redding and Venables (2004), Market Potential by Hanson
(2005) or Real Market Potential (RMP) by Head and Mayer (2004), the “real” aspect
being detailed below. Here I will adopt the market potential terminology in order no to
introduce confusion since market access is also often used for describing the level of tariffs
and other barriers faced by a country.
The relationship between factor incomes and market potential has been labeled the
wage equation. The founding contributions use the now classical Dixit-Stiglitz type of
monopolistic competition combined with iceberg trade costs. One might argue that this
is maybe not the most relevant framework for developing economies, at least in some
industries. It however seems that this prediction is somehow more general than what
was originally thought. The main elements for the wage equation to emerge seem to be
a gravity structure of bilateral trade combined with some rigidity in the distribution of
output shares of different countries in the world. I will here build on Head and Mayer
(2008) and try to keep as general as possible.
2.1 Gravity and the wage equation
The derivation makes use of the gravity equation that explain the pattern of bilateral trade
flows. Gravity involves two important constraints: budget allocation for the importer
and market-clearing for the exporter. Consider an exporter country i and an importer
country j. Budget allocation considers Xj the total expenditure of j to be allocated
between exporting countries, and Πij the proportion of income allocated to country i. By
definition:
Xij = ΠijXj, (1)
where
∑
iΠij = 1 and
∑
iXij = Xj.
The important step to derive a gravity equation from (1) is to show that Πij can be
expressed in the following multiplicatively separable form:
Πij =
Aiφij
Φj
. (2)
Loosely speaking, Ai represents “capabilities” of exporter i, 0 ≤ φij ≤ 1 represents the
ease of access of market j to exporters in i, and Φj measures the set of opportunities of
consumers in j or, equivalently, the degree of competition in that market.
A wide range of different micro-foundations yield the crucial requirement of equa-
tion (2). Those include Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competition, Anderson and van Win-
coop (2003) model based on national product differentiation, but also comparative advan-
tage models such as Eaton and Kortum (2002) and more recently models incorporating
firms’ heterogeneity such as Chaney (2007). All those models have their budget allocation
rule imply a gravity equation for bilateral trade which takes a simple multiplicative form:
Xij = Ai × φij ×Xj/Φj, (3)
and Φj =
∑
h φhjAh, with different definitions of Ai and φij depending naturally on the
specific structure of the model.
2
As a second accounting identity, it has to be that the sum of i’s shipments to all
destinations—including itself—equals the total value of i’s production, noted Qi.
Qi =
∑
j
Xij = Ai
∑
j
φijXj
Φj
. (4)
If Bi is country i’s trade balance, we have Qi ≡ Xi +Bi. At the world level,
∑
j Bj = 0,
and therefore production must be equal to expenditure, Q = X.
If we have data on both expenditures Xj and production, Qi, then the market-clearing
condition tell us something about the unobserved attribute of the exporter, Ai. To see this
define sXj = Xj/X = Xj/Q as country j’s share of world expenditure (and production).
Next, define the following term:
Φ∗i =
∑
h
φihs
X
h
Φh
. (5)
This term is central in what follows. It is an index of market potential or market access
(the same as in Redding and Venables, 2004, Head and Mayer 2004 or Hanson, 2005).
Relative access to individual markets is measured as φih/Φh. Hence, Φ
∗
i is an expenditure-
weighted average of relative access.
Hence, using (5) and (4), market-clearing conditions yields a very simple relationship
between the exporter’s capabilities Ai, its share of production s
Q
i ≡ Qi/Q and its market
potential index Φ∗i :
Ai = s
Q
i (Φ
∗
i )
−1 or sQi = AiΦ
∗
i . or A
−1
i s
Q
i = Φ
∗
i (6)
This relationship is very general since it relies only on the gravity assumptions, namely
the multiplicative budget allocation rule, and market clearing. The last formulation
is particularly illustrative of the forces at work in an economic geography model. An
exogenous increase in market potential Φ∗i , can translate in two different effects: one on
sQi , one on 1/Ai. Ai in all models involves a negative function of prices charged by i firms,
and therefore also their production costs. Suppose for a minute that those are constant.
A rise in market potential is therefore beneficial to firms located in i, and attracts firms
there, raising sQi . This is the mechanism behind the home market effect, as detailed in
Head and Mayer (2006). On the contrary, suppose that the country’s share of production
is left unchanged. The rise in market potential will have to be entirely absorbed through
a decrease in Ai, that is an increase in prices, and therefore wages practised in i. This
is the source of the wage equation, which therefore should hold for this class of model
when the production structure across countries exhibits some rigidity, which is the case
in Dixit-Stiglitz, and in Anderson van Wincoop (2003) notably. In practice, both effects
can naturally enter into play, their respective size depending on how rigid are the mobility
of factors and wages respectively. In what follows, I develop the wage equation part of
this fundamental relationship, and show that it is quite successful empirically, as in the
existing literature.
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The precise derivation of an estimable wage equation involves to specify two things
more precisely: Ai and s
Q
i . In some models, and in particular in Dixit-Stiglitz-Krugman,
sQi is in fact a constant. Indeed in this model, all firms are symmetric and the zero profit
condition imposes a uniform firm-level production of q∗. The exporter’s capabilities being
Ai = Nip
1−σ
i , we obtain
p1−σi =
Nipiq
∗
NiQ
(Φ∗i )
−1 ⇒ pi = κ1(Φ∗i )1/σ, (7)
where κ1 =
(
q∗
Q
)1/σ
is a constant. This equation means that firms in i faced with a good
access to world markets (a high Φ∗i ) can increase their price accordingly.
1 To simplify
suppose that the production process in i involves an immobile composite factor, labor
with share β, price wi and productivity zi. Other factors of production (with share α
are supposed to have a constant price over countries, r. Since producer prices in the
DSK model are a simple markup over marginal costs, pi =
σ
σ−1
rαwβi
zi
, we obtain the wage
equation:
wi = κ2 × z1/βi × (Φ∗i )1/(βσ), (8)
where κ2 =
(
σ−1
σrα
κ1
)1/β
is again a constant. Wages in i will be a positive function of
the productivity of workers there (zi) and market potential of the country (Φ
∗
i ). In the
empirical part of the paper, I will consider that productivity of an economy i is a positive
function of the average years of schooling of its working age population. The empirical
counterpart of Φ∗i is more complex and deserves its own subsection.
2.2 Market Potential computation
In the Dixit-Stiglitz model of trade, the set of alternatives to consumers in h, Φh is
inversely related to the CES price index of accessing all varieties from this country 1/Φh =
P 1−σh . Market potential can be re-expressed as
Φ∗i = 1/Q×
∑
h
φihXhP
1−σ
h , (9)
and bilateral trade as
Xij = AiφijXj/Φj = Nip
1−σ
i φijXjP
1−σ
j , (10)
This equation can be estimated using a bilateral trade dataset, taking logs, specifying a
vector if trade costs composing lnφij and absorbing ln(Nip
1−σ
i ) as a fixed effect for the
exporter country (FEi) and ln(XjP
1−σ
j ) as a fixed effect for the importer country (FEj).
The market potential can therefore be re-constructed as
Φ̂∗iQ =
∑
h
φ̂ih exp(F̂Ej). (11)
1In fact, firms in this model must increase their price if the zero profit condition is to be satisfied,
since such an increase reduces the demand they face.
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The second stage wage equation in logs becomes then
lnwi = κ3 +
1
β
ln zi +
1
βσ
lnRMPi, (12)
where RMPi ≡ Φ̂∗i , and the constant is now κ3 = lnκ2 + 1σ lnQ.
As in Redding and Venables (2004), I consider income per capita to be a natural proxy
for the price of immobile factors in i, wi. The real market potential RMP is therefore
an element explaining income per capita of the country. An empirical issue with RMP is
that it contains own income Xi, causing evident endogeneity issue. This problem is all
the more important that local trade costs are lower than international trade costs, a well
documented fact, known as the border effect, which I will estimate below. A solution
that has been proposed by the literature is to calculate a
FMPi ≡
∑
h 6=i
φ̂ih exp(F̂Ej),
which does not include own demand of the country. This alleviates the endogeneity
problem although it does not constitute an ideal solution as will be clear below.
3 Data
The needed data for the empirical exercise is fairly standard. The first stage is a fixed
effect gravity equation that require bilateral trade flows over a long time period, obtained
from IMF DOTS, and a vector of trade impediments, obtained from CEPII.2 The second
stage involves factor incomes on the left hand side, and productivity on the right hand
side, combined with the first stage market potential estimate. Following Redding and
Venables, I consider income per capita of the country to be a good measure of immobile
factor incomes.3 Skill measures come from Barro and Lee.
I will present below RMP estimated from two different methods. They differ in one
dimension which is how the effect of national borders is considered. More precisely, in
RMPi =
∑
h φ̂ih exp(F̂Ej), there is an issue about the measurement of φii. In addition
to having shorter distance, self-trade has a preferential dimension, that has been widely
documented in the border effect literature (see Anderson and van Wincoop, 2004 for a
survey of the evidence). Redding and Venables (2004) deal with this by an adjustment
on the distance coefficient, which they divide by two for self-trade in their preferred
specification. Head and Mayer (2004) adopt a different approach by estimating those
border effects in the first step. This method involves measuring self trade for all countries
in the world over the period. At the industry level, this is fairly easy, one just has to
take global production of an industry, and retrieve total exports to obtain “exports” to
2http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.htm
3It is possible to go into deeper industry level detail, where the LHS variable becomes average wage
in the industry. Head and Mayer (2006) do this for a European sample, Paillacar (2008) provide data
and analysis for a much larger sample of countries and years.
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self. For aggregate trade, this is a little bit more subtle, since one needs to retrieve total
exports from the value of production that is actually tradable in the country. I follow
Wei (1996) initial method here and consider the non-service part of the country’s GDP
to be its tradable part. In what follows, the two methods will be referred to as RV04 and
HM04 respectively.
4 Gravity results
The first step estimates a gravity-type relationship where bilateral trade is regressed each
year on a set of importer and exporter dummies and on a vector of trade impediments
that is larger than the one used by Redding and Venables (2004), who focus on distance
and contiguity only. The components of φij include distance and contiguity, but also
common language, colonial links, dummies for common membership of a regional trade
agreement (RTA), a currency union (CU) or GATT/ WTO. Summarizing results from
the HM04 method estimation, including border effects, the average fit is .73, with an
average number of observations around 13000. The average coefficients on trade costs
are very much in line with existing findings. The coefficients for distance is very close to
-1 and common language, RTA and GATT membership have comparable mean effects
around .4.
I present figures of the resulting coefficients over time. The most interesting and
puzzling result is the increasing coefficient of distance on trade flows over time in panel
(a) of figure 1. This trend is not isolated in the literature. Disdier and Head (2008) report
such an evolution in their meta-analysis of distance coefficients in gravity equations.
In what is perhaps the most comparable set of results in terms of estimation method,
Redding and Schott (2003) show in their Table 1, that the coefficient on distance starts at
-1.18 in 1970 and rises gradually to end at -1.49 in 1995 (they only include contiguity in
the regression as a control for trade costs, which might explain the slightly lower impact
of distance in their case in all years).4
Panel (b) of figure 1 shows a more expected result, namely that the impact of national
borders decreases over time. Note however that the estimated negative impact of crossing
a national border on trade flows remains considerable in 2003, with a dividing factor
around 50. This figure naturally aggregates very different situations, and is probably
driven by developing countries that are usually estimated to have much larger border
effects. Figure 2 present the schedule of estimated coefficients for colonial linkages and
common RTA membership across time. The preferential trading relationship between ex-
colonies and their ex-hegemon has a striking downward trend. While the effect remains
strongly positive in the early 2000s, the relative deterioration of historical preferences
is extremely clear, and should have important consequences for the market potential of
4This puzzling increase in the impact of distance might be due to several statistical artifacts. For
instance, increased regionalism combined with the end of colonialism in this period. I do however control
for those two factors here. Also the increase in the number of trade partners in the database, mostly
from small and remote countries might cause this trend. I restricted the sample to the set of country
pairs with positive trade for at least 25 years and obtained very similar results.
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Figure 1: The effects of distance and national borders on trade
(a) distance (b) national borders
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Figure 2: The effects of colonial linkages and regional agreements on trade
(a) ex-colonies (b) RTAs
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the ex-colonies, which are usually small markets located near to other small markets. I
will return to that point in the next section. The evolution of the RTA coefficient seems
to be strongly influenced by changes in the composition of the main agreements. The
effect drops massively around 1973 and 1986 which are dates of significant entries into the
European Community (UK, Ireland and Denmark in the first case, Spain and Portugal
in the second). Entries of countries into an RTA tends to initially lower the statistical
estimate of its effect quite naturally. The effect is also present in 1994, when Mexico adds
to the already free trade area between the USA and Canada to form NAFTA.
5 Market potential results
5.1 Graphical representation
The above summarized gravity equations enable a computation of market potential in-
dices, RMPi and FMPi, along the lines described in section 2.2, for all countries with
available trade data over the 1960-2003 period. This will allow to replicate and much
further understand the income per capita / market potential relationship uncovered by
Redding and Venables (2004). I start by replicating one of their most interesting figure,
in which GDP per capita in i is graphed against RMPi and FMPi. I express both in
relative terms to the USA in 2003, in order to ease the reading of the axes on figure 3.
The existence of a tight relationship between market potential and income per capita is
quite clear. Larger and /or more centrally located countries are much richer than coun-
tries characterized by a small local market and few or also small neighbors. The case of
Belgium and Netherlands is of course very interesting: with the exception of Hong-Kong
and Singapour5, Belgium and the Netherlands are the two top market potential countries
in terms of RMP. Looking at panel (b) shows that this comes in great part from their
advantageous location, as for Switzerland. Opposed to the case of those countries are
the United States and Japan. Both are among the top RMP economies, but that comes
almost entirely from their internal demand, since in terms of FMP, panel (b) shows a
quite weak position. China and Thailand are similar cases for the developing world. Both
have a quite high RMP (which should warrant higher average wages, according to panel
a) but a fairly average FMP.
Moving away from cross-section, one can exploit the new dimension of my market
potential estimates to evaluate whether this tight relationship has had some persistence
over time. Figure 4 confirms that this is the case. In 1970, a year where the United
States were still the richest economy in the world, or in 1985 for instance, the statistical
association of GDP per capita with RMP is obvious.
I continue the illustration with maps. The preceding graphs show an interesting corre-
lation between RMP and income, but makes it hard to detect what is core in the concept
5As can be seen from comparing both panels of figure 3, the very high RMP of Hong-Kong and
Singapour comes mostly from the internal part. This comes from the fact that a fairly large expenditure
is located in both cases on an extremely small territory. The precise internal distance assumed plays a
role in such special cases.
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Figure 3: Market Potential and development in 2003
(a) Real Market Potential (b) Foreign Market Potential
CHE
LSO IND
COG GUY
VNM
GNB
BIHALB
KEN
ROM
DZA
FIN
KNA
SVN
CAN
BLZ
DEU NLD
KWT
GAB
ISL
MOZ
MNG
FRA
IRN
BOL
ZWE
NER
KGZ
CZE
BEL
RWA
TUR
CYP
MDG
HUN
BHR
SUR
CIV
YEM
STP
BRB
MLI
IRQ
BDI
ARM
AFG
MYS
SWE
YUG
CRI
LBR
MRT
PRT
B R
HRV
ERI
WSM
IRL
ZMB
JAM
GBR
SLE
POL
TKM
COM
ZAF
ITA
CHN
RUS
JPN
DOM
AUT
CO
SAU
PAKPNG
MKD
URY
BTN
JOR
ESP
KHM
GTM
GRC
AGO
HTI
TUN
ARG
UZB
SWZ
FJI
NZL HKG
CMR
LVA
GHA
VEN
LBY
ATG
TCD
ECU
MUS
CPV
CHL
ETH
PAN
SYR
OMN
PER
GRD
NIC
LAO
DJI
BRA
SVK
MAR
DNK
LKA
VCT
BHS
DMA
AUS
BN
BFA
IN
KIR SEN
NAM
QAT
TGO
SLB
THA
LTU
BGD
GMBNPL
MEX
ISR
HNDAZE
LCA
TZA
PLW
BLR
NOR
KOR
UGA
TTOSYC
ZAR
PHL
EGY
TON
MDV
EST
UKR
ARE
MWI
BWA
GNQ
NGA
SGP
MD
VUT
SLV
IDN
SDN
MLT
GEO
TJK
PRY
KAZ
CAF
B
USA
.
01
.
1
.
5
1
1.
5
in
co
m
e 
pe
r c
ap
ita
 / 
US
A
.01 .1 .5 1 5 10 100
real market potential / USA
CHE
LSOIND
COG GUY
VNM
GNB
BIH ALB
KEN
ROM
DZA
FIN
KNA
SVN
CAN
BLZ
DEU NLD
KWT
GAB
ISL
MOZ
MNG
FRA
IRN
BOL
ZWE
NER
KGZ
CZE
BEL
RWA
TUR
CYP
MDG
HUN
BHR
SUR
CIV
YEM
STP
BRB
MLI
IRQ
BDI
ARM
AFG
MYS
SWE
YUG
CRI
LBR
RT
PRT
BGR
HRV
ERI
WSM
IRL
ZMB
JAM
GBR
SLE
POL
TKM
COM
ZAF
ITA
CHN
RUS
JPN
DOM
AUT
C L
SAU
PAKPNG
MKD
URY
BTN
JOR
ESP
KHM
GTM
GRC
AGO
HTI
TUN
ARG
UZB
SWZ
FJI
NZL HKG
CMR
LVA
GHA
VEN
LBY
ATG
TCD
ECU
MUS
CPV
CHL
ETH
PAN
SYR
OMN
PER
GRD
NIC
LAO
DJI
BRA
SVK
MAR
DNK
LKA
VCT
BHS
DMA
AUS
LBN
BFA
GIN
KIR SEN
NAM
QAT
TGO
SLB
THA
LTU
D
GMBNPL
MEX
ISR
HNDAZE
LCA
TZA
PLW
BLR
NOR
KOR
UGA
TTOSYC
ZAR
PHL
EGY
TON
MDV
EST
UKR
ARE
MWI
WA
GNQ
NGA
SGP
MDA
VUT
SLV
IDN
SDN
MLT
GEO
TJK
PRY
KAZ
CAF
BEN
USA
.
01
.
1
.
5
1
1.
5
in
co
m
e 
pe
r c
ap
ita
 / 
US
A
.1 .5 1 5 10 100
foreign market potential / USA
Figure 4: Market Potential and development over time
(a) RMP 1970 (b) RMP 1985
AUS
TWN
CMR
FRA
KWT
AFG
BFA
GBR
GTM
IRL
SLB
HKG
HNDPNG
CAN
MUS
URY
IRN
CHL
ZAR GHA
IND
BMUSUN
CZS
HTI
ISR
GNQ
NLD
SWE
CAF
TTOBRB
PAK
SYC
CRI
LUX
GMB
DNK
KIR
GUY
BOL
FIN
COL
ZMB
BWA NER
EGY
PER
VNM
IRQ
ZAF
SDN
LBN
SGP
ECU
NG
ISL
BHS
DEU
GIN
QAT
MDG
YUG
PAN
GNB
JOR
MEX
SLV
AUT
SLE
FJI
UGA
HUN
SAU
NZL
JPN
LSO
COG
PYF
KOR
OMN
VEN
MRT
BEN
SWZ PRK
ITA
TZA
NIC
POL
SYR
MAR
SOM
NPL
BLZ
ROM
ALB
IVLBR
MYS
TCD
CUB
GRC
BEL
CHN
IDN
ETHRWA
MNG
KHM
STP
PRT
TUR
SEN
SUR
BDI
LBY
MMR
CYP
DOM
ES
MLI
TGO
BGR
MWI
BRA
DZA
T N
PHL
NCL
ZWE
THA
PRY
ARG
KA
NOR
GAB
LAO
JAM
CHE
MLT
KEN
USA
.
01
.
1
.
5
1
1.
5
in
co
m
e 
pe
r c
ap
ita
 / 
US
A
.01 .1 .5 1 1.5
real market potential / USA
IDN
CAF
MNG
STP
IND
NOR
NZL
IRN
GNQ
PHL
PRY
SYR
ZWEGUY
CUB
SGP
BMU
IRQ
FIN
JAM
NAM
RWA
ZAF
SUR
PAK
ZAR
HTI
DZA
ROM
TWN
MYS JOR
HND
BGD
ZMB
GTM
TGOBDI
MRT
SYC
SAU
MEX
SLB
CZS
GNB
IRL
KNA
SWE
PAN
NER
OMN
CHE
KEN
GRD
GAB
CHL
DJI
COM
FJI
SDN
DEU
MOZ
YUG
BFA
GRCESP
NIC
HKG
SWZ
PYF
DOM
HUN
VNM
GHA
BRN
MAR
AUS
MWI
GMB
SEN
MDV
BLZ
LBR
BGR
WSM
ATG
NPL
GBRITA
TTO
ALB
QAT
COG
MLT
NLD
PV
MDGTZA
CYP
LSO
LBN
MLI
NGA
KWT
DMA
PNG
DNK
PRT
BHS
LAO
SLE
COL
EGY
TCD
BEL
FRA
POL
BRB
ANT
AFG
CAN
ISR
VCT
UGA
CHN
JPN
URY
LBY
NCL
ETH
ISL
BRA
ECU
BWA
AUT
MUS
TON
VEN
KOR
EN
MMR
LCA
CMR
ARG
BOL
GIN
SLV
SOM
VUT
ARE
AGO
SUN
LKA
TUN
CRI
CIV
PRK
PER
T R
BHR
THA
KIR
USA
.
01
.
1
.
5
1
1.
5
in
co
m
e 
pe
r c
ap
ita
 / 
US
A
.01 .1 .5 1 1.5
real market potential / USA
9
of market potential, the spatial correlation of the forces behind economic development.
Indeed, the theory of market potential tells us that being near large markets makes a
country richer, and therefore itself a large market. This suggests that in equilibrium,
“spatial clubs” of development will form. It will be very hard for a country surrounded
by a small and poor economies to reach a high level of income per capita, and inversely,
the proximity of large and wealthy countries is a strong advantage in this economic ge-
ography world. The maps contained in figures 5 and 6 represent the levels of RMP and
FMP in each country in the world, expressed again relative to the United States in 2003.
Those are still based on the HM04 methodology. Those figures indeed show evidence of
spatial correlation in RMP and even more in FMP. Western Europe, North America and
to a lesser extent East Asia are places were the spatial proximity of high GDP countries
fuels each other’s market potential and therefore income. The case of the United States
and its immediate neighbors is illustrative of the problems raised by FMP. While the
RMP figure in 2003 predicts the USA to have a much higher income per capita than
Canada and Mexico, the reverse is true for FMP. One can also see in the FMP map the
extent to which high demand zones exert a positive influence on their neighbors. The
“pull-factor” of Western Europe is particularly visible in Eastern Europe and Northern
Africa, while central America is clearly benefiting from being close to NAFTA countries
in terms of FMP.
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Figure 5: RMP 2003
Figures 7 and 8 are probably the most illustrative of the market potential forces at
work over time. Those two figures present maps of the evolution of market potential over
time for each country in the world. The precise figure represented is the change in terms
of ranks (gained or lost) in the market potential hierarchy, relative to the United States.
Both figures, and in particular the Foreign Market Potential one makes very apparent
the existence of market potential clubs of countries geographically proximate and having
similar rates of high or low income growth that fuel each other market potential, and
therefore income growth. East Asian countries are characterized by a very fast growing
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Figure 6: FMP 2003
market potential during the period, while most if not all African countries are faced with
neighbors receding in the worldwide hierarchy of market potential, which dampens their
possibilities of economic expansion. In Latin and South America, there seem to be a
clear gradient, where proximity to the Northern part of the continent helps the growth
of market potential. Note also that Eastern Europe suffers from a low growth of the
overall market potential during this period, despite a high growth of their FMP, driven
by increased access to Western European markets. Particularly striking is the strong
performance of three emerging countries over that period in terms of RMP: Mexico,
Turkey and Malaysia. The performance of Turkey is particularly remarkable since figure 8
reveals that its FMP, that is the dynamism of its neighbors, actually decreased during
that period. On the contrary, Mexico and Malaysia benefited largely from a very dynamic
geographic environment.
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Figure 7: RMP rank evolution 1970-2003
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Figure 8: FMP rank evolution 1970-2003
5.2 Baseline results
As stated above, I have several specifications of the RMP variable: one that follows
the Redding and Venables (2004) approach to internal trade, which simply divides the
distance coefficient by half for internal trade. The other following Head and Mayer (2004),
who estimate instead border effects in the gravity equation, that is the privileged access
of producers to their own market from the data, rather than assuming a functional form
of distance on it. In order to provide comparison with existing results, I start with the
RV04 specification in Table 1. Column (1) mimics RV04, providing results for a cross
section of 182 countries in 1995 (they use 101 countries in 1996, but the skills data I
use later is only available every five year, including 1995). The coefficient is .58, slightly
larger than the .395 they obtain. I interpret the difference, as well as the respectable
but lower fit of .445, as the consequence of the much larger sample of countries used.
Column (2) pools over the whole set of years available for our countries, and column (3)
presents results with country fixed effects, which are to our knowledge the first within
estimates of this type of equation. The within results are particularly interesting. Market
potential can potentially be correlated with a vast number of other variables relevant to
the level and growth of income per capita. This is the rationale behind Table 2 of
Redding and Venables (2004), that includes a large number of controls draw from the
development literature. Those include primary resource endowments, other features of
physical geography, but also measures of property rights protection, and a dummy if the
country was under socialist rule between 1960 and 1985. Most of those controls offer
variance that is mostly or exclusively cross-sectional. The use of panel data with country
fixed effects permits to control for those and all other factors constant over time, that can
affect the level of income per capita. As expected, the coefficients on market potential
drops but stays very significant and within a range comparable to the literature on this
type of estimates.
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The last three columns report coefficients using foreign market potential only. Recall
that this is a way to alleviate the endogeneity problem, but not a perfect one. Theory
requires own market size to affect the level of factors’ income of a country, since those
sales to domestic consumers often represent a large part of overall sales. Coefficients are
somehow surprisingly larger than for the complete market potential, and the fit is lower
(more expectedly). Note that this is also the case in Redding and Venables (2004). Once
again, the use of panel data reduces the estimated impact of market potential, but leaves
it strongly positive and significant.
Table 1: Market Potential and GDP/cap RV method
Dependent Variable: ln GDP/cap
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln RMP (RV04) 0.58a 0.56a 0.47a
(0.05) (0.04) (0.01)
ln FMP (RV04) 0.88a 0.88a 0.57a
(0.11) (0.10) (0.02)
Time Frame 1995 1960-2003 1960-2003 1995 1960-2003 1960-2003
Country FE No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 180 6761 6761 180 6761 6761
R2 0.445 0.539 0.791 0.280 0.347 0.753
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Levels of statistical significance are signaled
by a (1%), b (5%), and c (10%). Robust standard errors clustered by
country in columns (2), (3), (5) and (6). Those columns also include a full
set of year dummies. Within R2 reported in columns (3) and (6).
The RV04 results are therefore robust to panel data estimation, which is the first
important and comforting finding of this paper. The impact of economic geography
(market access) on income per capita is not driven by some fixed omitted variable in the
cross-sectional regression. The within impact is smaller than in the cross-sectional one,
as expected but remains economically large in magnitude. Pushing further the inspection
of the impact of market potential, one can naturally be worried that some time varying
factor might be omitted from the regression. The first such factor of concern is of course
the evolution of average skills in the population. Theory and dozens of empirical paper
tells us that education should enter this equation, and might possibly have a relationship
with market potential, for instance if the incentives to accumulate human capital are
larger in large/central markets. Note that the original Redding and Venables (2004)
paper did not control for skills, although another paper co-authored by Steve Redding
shows that indeed the level of skills in a country is related to its market access (Redding
and Schott, 2003). More recently, some papers have included education levels as controls:
Head and Mayer (2006) on a regional level basis, Fally et al. (2008) and Hering and Poncet
(forthcoming) at the individual level for Brazilian and Chinese workers respectively.6
6Duranton and Monastiriotis (2002) for the UK, Combes, Duranton and Gobillon (2008) for France,
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Table 2 includes the Barro and Lee measure of average years of schooling among the
more than 25 years old in the population of the country. The cross-sectional and pooled
results of market potential in columns 1, 2, 4 and 5 are lowered as expected. The preferred
within specification however maintains a very significant and high coefficient on both the
complete and foreign measures of market potential.
Table 2: Market Potential and GDP/cap RV method - with skills control
Dependent Variable: ln GDP/cap
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Average years of schooling 0.38a 0.28a 0.03 0.42a 0.36a 0.12a
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
ln RMP (RV04) 0.28a 0.31a 0.50a
(0.06) (0.05) (0.03)
ln FMP (RV04) 0.42a 0.39a 0.60a
(0.09) (0.06) (0.06)
Time Frame 1995 1960-2003 1960-2003 1995 1960-2003 1960-2003
Country FE No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 108 937 937 108 937 937
R2 0.779 0.788 0.839 0.774 0.759 0.816
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Levels of statistical significance are signaled
by a (1%), b (5%), and c (10%). Robust standard errors clustered by
country in columns (2), (3), (5) and (6). Those columns also include a full
set of year dummies. Within R2 reported in columns (3) and (6).
Tables 3 and 4 replicate the regressions of Tables 1 and 2, with the HM04 method of
estimating market potential, which introduces border effects directly, rather than through
a differential effect of internal distance. Results are very comparable, with a slightly
better fit in general, and larger coefficients for market potential variables. Note also the
very high coefficients on the skills variable in the non-within specifications. The lower
values obtained when using the country fixed effects reinforce the attractiveness of those
specifications: the estimates averaging around .10 are now more comparable to what has
been found in the above quoted literature (Head and Mayer, 2006, Fally et al., 2008, and
Hering and Poncet, forthcoming).
In the following, I stick to the HM04 methodology, including the Barro-Lee control
for skills in the country, which is the specification that seem to yield the most interesting
results. It is interesting to quantify a little bit more precisely those results, going further
than statistical significance. Consider the following experiment: In 2003, take a country
with a low RMP, say the Congo Democratic Republic, and one with a large RMP, say
Thailand, which in 2003 has an RMP 66 times larger than CDR. Using the 0.37 estimate
of column (2) in Table 4, raising the RMP of CDR to the one of Thailand is predicted
and Mion and Naticchioni (2005) for Italy, had all already shown (in specifications less grounded in
economic geography theory) that geographic wage differentials are largely influenced by skill differences.
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Table 3: Market Potential and GDP/cap HM method
Dependent Variable: ln GDP/cap
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln RMP (HM04) 0.80a 0.70a 0.59a
(0.06) (0.05) (0.02)
ln FMP (HM04) 0.88a 0.88a 0.58a
(0.11) (0.10) (0.02)
Time Frame 1995 1960-2003 1960-2003 1995 1960-2003 1960-2003
Country FE No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 180 6245 6245 180 6245 6245
R2 0.521 0.547 0.748 0.280 0.318 0.711
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Levels of statistical significance are signaled
by a (1%), b (5%), and c (10%). Robust standard errors clustered by
country in columns (2), (3), (5) and (6). Those columns also include a full
set of year dummies. Within R2 reported in columns (3) and (6).
Table 4: Market Potential and GDP/cap HM method - with skills control
Dependent Variable: ln GDP/cap
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Average years of schooling 0.37a 0.29a 0.08b 0.42a 0.36a 0.12a
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
ln RMP (HM04) 0.41a 0.37a 0.55a
(0.06) (0.05) (0.04)
ln FMP (HM04) 0.42a 0.39a 0.65a
(0.09) (0.06) (0.06)
Time Frame 1995 1960-2003 1960-2003 1995 1960-2003 1960-2003
Country FE No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 108 866 866 108 866 866
R2 0.809 0.791 0.804 0.773 0.747 0.792
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Levels of statistical significance are signaled
by a (1%), b (5%), and c (10%). Robust standard errors clustered by
country in columns (2), (3), (5) and (6). Those columns also include a full
set of year dummies. Within R2 reported in columns (3) and (6).
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to increase its GDP per capita by a factor of around 24, while the real ratio in 2003 is
around 22. Part of this increase is in fact tautological since own GDP enters RMP as
stated above. Another interesting experiment is to raise FMP of a country, which does
not include own GDP. Still in 2003, I observe Brazil to be in the tenth percentile of the
lowest FMP countries, while Mexico is ranked 18th in terms of FMP, among the top ten
percent countries. Using column (5) estimate, the model predicts that based on a 900%
difference in FMP, Mexico should have a GDP per capita around five times higher than
Brazil, the real factor being 2.24. Last, one wants to evaluate the size of the market
potential impact based on within variance alone. Over the last ten years of our sample
(1993-2003) the average growth of RMP is 111%, and the corresponding figure for FMP is
161%. Using estimates from columns (3) and (6), this corresponds to a predicted income
per capita growth of 61% and 105% respectively. In addition to the very strong fit of
the model, and the very high precision of market potential coefficients, the economic
magnitude implied by the estimates is therefore quite large.
5.3 Instrumented results
As stated above, substituting FMP to RMP helps to solve partially the endogeneity
problem, since own income does not appear any more in the explanation of income per
capita. However, it is a significant departure from the theory. Returning to maps helps
clarify the point. Comparing figures 5 and 6, some striking differences appear. One of
them is for the United States. While the United States has a much larger RMP than
Canada and Mexico, it has a much lower FMP than both. If foreign demand was the
only driver of factor incomes in the NEG model, Canada and Mexico should both be
richer than the USA. On the contrary, the NEG model predicts that the United States
should be richer than its two neighbors precisely because it has a large internal demand
that makes it a more profitable location for firms. The same paradox of FMP is very
clearly appearing for Brazil. Hence FMP has nice features, but is clearly not ideal as an
instrument for RMP. What is preferable is an instrument that does not use the income
information altogether, but keeps the measures of trade costs, including trade costs to
self. We look for an exogenous source of variance of RMP that would come from trade
costs, in the cross-section and if possible in the time dimension as well. Geographic
centrality of i (
∑
j d
−1
ij ) is a good candidate that has been used in the literature, but
that does not vary over time. A related instrument that does vary over time is
∑
j φijt,
that is the complete measure of trade costs, including RTAs, currency unions... which
vary in membership. Note also that my first-step gravity regression estimates trade costs
coefficients (on distance, common language...) for each year. This is another source of
variance of the φijt over time that can be exploited. Table 5 reports results. The first
stage F-test shows that the two proposed instruments are quite powerful determinants of
RMP either in the cross-section or in the temporal dimensions. Column (4) is the most
demanding, instrumenting while including the full sets of country and year dummies.
The first stage regression exhibits an unreported coefficient of .77 on
∑
j φijt explaining
RMP in the pure within dimension, with a t-stat of nearly 13. The second stage result
16
show both a very significant effect of RMP, and a more reasonable coefficient of schooling
near .10. Combined with the set of results on FMP, this instrumentation strategy leaves
me quite confident that endogeneity, while a potentially serious issue in this type of
regression, is not seriously biasing results here.
Table 5: Market Potential and GDP/cap HM method - with skills control and IV
Dependent Variable: ln GDP/cap
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln RMP (HM04) 0.40a 0.40a 0.30b 0.35a
(0.12) (0.10) (0.12) (0.10)
Average years of schooling 0.37a 0.28a 0.31a 0.10a
(0.05) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03)
Time Frame 1995 1960-2003 1960-2003 1960-2003
Country FE No No No Yes
IV
∑
j d
−1
ij
∑
j d
−1
ij
∑
j φijt
∑
j φijt
First stage F 31.83 23.21 12.65 127.59
Observations 108 866 866 855
R2 0.809 0.791 0.789 0.797
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Levels of statistical significance are signaled
by a (1%), b (5%), and c (10%). Robust standard errors clustered by
country in columns (2), (3) and (4). Those columns also include a full set
of year dummies. Within R2 reported in columns (4).
5.4 Simulated policy changes
An application of the wage equation that has not been used before is to evaluate what
would be the market potential effect and therefore the impact on wage / income per capita
in the country of a trade policy change. For instance, if a country enters a regional trading
arrangement (RTA), its access to demand from other members of the RTA improves,
which raises its RMP. the wage equation theoretical framework tells us that this should
impact the average wage of the country. By how much depends on a certain number of
things: The size and locations of the other members of the RTA (which will determine the
RMP boost), and the elasticity of wages to RMP. Theory (equation 12) tells us that this
elasticity is σβ, the product of the constant elasticity of substitution and of the share of
labor in the production function. Let us take reasonable values for those two parameters
such that σ = 5 and β = 0.2. Then I run the following experiment: Suppose that in 2003,
all RTAs in the world were ended, everything else staying unchanged. What would be the
predicted loss of wage / income per capita predicted by the economic geography model?
I do the experiment for both RTAs and the WTO and report results for the 50 biggest
drops in Table 6. This table reports wage fall in percent of the benchmark wage estimated
from the market potential graphed in figure 3. In 2003, the first stage gravity equation
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reveals that the average RTA raises bilateral trade by exp(0.538)−1 = 71% and that two
members of the GATT/WTO have their bilateral trade increased by exp(0.592)−1 = 80%.
The global effect then depends naturally on the size and locations of your partners in
those agreements.
In a world with no RTA, the countries that would be notably poorer are a group of
mostly small but relatively rich economies. The small EU countries would notably lose
(Ireland has a predicted loss of 20%), but also Canada and Mexico. The low income
countries would not in fact lose a lot in terms of market potential, since the RTAs in-
volving them do not count large and/or rich economies among them, Mali for instance is
predicted to lose only 1.7 % of its wage level. The picture is radically changed however
if the no-WTO world is considered. The most important losses in this case are for the
poorest economies in the world, that we have seen have a very low “local” RMP, and
depend very much on demand from far away larger markets of WTO members. For in-
stance, the Malian loss would now be 36%. South-South RTAs might be important for
other reasons (for instance because of their pacifying effects, see Martin et al. 2008), but
in terms of the market potential sources of income per capita differentials, multilateral
trade liberalization seems to be much more important. Those simulations should natu-
rally be taken with great caution. The everything-else-equal assumption of the thought
experiment might be more reasonable for some countries than for others, and the results
are of course sensitive to the assumed value of σβ and to estimates of trade effects of
RTAs and the WTO.
6 Conclusion
This paper provides evidence that access to markets, measured here as a theory-based
index of market potential is an important factor in development. I generalize the theoret-
ical and empirical finding of Redding and Venables (2004) in many directions, and find
very robust evidence that the economic geography of countries matter greatly in their
income per capita trajectory. To illustrate, my results show that in 2003, bringing the
market potential of the Congo Democratic Republic to the one of Thailand is predicted
to increase its GDP per capita by a factor of around 24. The average growth of market
potential due to neighbor countries between 1993 and 2003 in our sample is estimated to
have raised income per capita by around 105%.
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